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Abstract:  
 
This dissertation aims to construct an analytical framework for international 
statebuilding. This framework is based on the reading of to interrelated themes. The 
first theme is phronésis – practical wisdom on how to inquire and act on social prob-
lems; while the second theme is that of parrhésia – the practice of truth-telling which 
involves an ontological commitment to the truth. Here, the question of what is good 
and bad for man in particular circumstances, takes predominance over theoretical 
concerns of social problems. Chapter one outlines the ideas of phronésis, from Aristo-
tle’s initial arguments to the later re-emergence and formulation as a social science 
ideal. The second chapter consists in a thorough reading of Michel Foucault’s lectures 
on parrhésia. Here, the main argument is that while traditional political philosophy 
has been preoccupied with scrutinizing institutional frameworks, the secret of politics 
to the Ancient Greeks was to bring into play the ‘ethical difference’ in regards to the 
truth-telling of the political man indexed to the concrete exercise of power. Chapter 
three explores the synergies and similarities between phronésis and parrhésia and ar-
gues that they are mutually dependent, where after the chapter scrutinizing the rela-
tionship between parrhésia and Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality’. In chapter 
four, a genealogy of the statebuilding literature reveals that the statebuilding debate 
has been one between, on the one hand, those who emphasise the importance of de-
contextualised knowledge and institutional frameworks, and on the other hand, those 
who emphasise contextual knowledge and the importance of including ‘local ele-
ments’ in institutional design; neither of which is an emphasis on phronésis and 
parrhésia. Based on the newly constructed framework of Phronetic Statebuilding, the 
dissertation argues that the statebuilding literature has to move in the direction of 
phronésis and parrhésia if international efforts of statebuilding are to be successful.    
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A Debate Caught Between Confidence and Despair 
 
Two moods determine the attitude of our civilization to the social world: confidence 
in the power of reason, as represented by modern science, to solve the social prob-
lems of our age and despair at the ever renewed failure of scientific reason to solve 
them. Hans J. Morgenthau (1946)
1
 
 
By the end of the Cold War, the emergence of a new “liberal” epoch of international 
relations seemed imminent to the liberal democracies of the West. This newfound op-
timism regarding the international order was grounded on the basis of a Zeitgeist that 
was built upon the confidence in democracy, the rule of law, and the functioning of a 
liberal market economy. Looking at the Western liberal democracies, it was assumed 
that building functioning states could solve the problems of conflict-torn societies and 
failing governments; this policy response has been termed statebuilding. However, 
there has been a lack of success in international efforts to establish sustainable peace 
and liberal governments through the policy of statebuilding in large parts of the 
world. A lack, which has persistently been explained through a critical engagement of 
the framework of “liberal peace.”2 
Accordingly, the academic debate has been divided between the all too well 
known dichotomy of “problem-solvers” and “critical theorists.”3 The “problem solv-
ing” approaches study the success and failures of statebuilding operations, but have 
yet to find the “silver bullet” that will help them overcome their inescapable despair; 
                                                 
1
 Morgenthau, Hans J (1946) Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, Midway Reprint) p. 1 (italics added) 
2
 See, for example: Duffield, Mark (2001) Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of De-
velopment and Security (London: Zed Books); Paris, Roland (2002) ‘International Peacebuilding and 
the “Mission Civilisatrice”’, Review of International Studies, 28:4 pp. 637–56; Pugh, Michael (2005) 
‘The Political Economy of Peacebuilding: A Critical Theory Perspective’, International Journal of 
Peace Studies, 10:2 pp. 23–42; Richmond, Oliver P. (2005) The Transformation of Peace (Basing-
stoke: MacMillan) 
3
 This is the popular dichotomy established by Cox in Cox, R.W. (1981) ‘Social Forces, States and 
World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 
10:2, pp. 126–155 
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while the “critical” approaches, it would seem, have fallen far more astray from their 
initial intent.
4
 David Chandler, dividing the critiques between radical “power-based” 
and policy “idea-based” critiques, the latter centred around the inevitable pitfall of 
western ideas and values, while the former targets western “hegemonic interests” or 
“power relations”, argues that what has been studied is a mirage. Inquiry has been 
concerned not with policy practice, but with the straw-man of Classical Liberalism.
5
 
As such, this epistemological critique has been less concerned with the “experience” 
of statebuilding than with problematizing the ‘liberal’ assumptions of modernity. The 
result is that both power and idea based critiques end up arguing that the explanation 
for the problems of statebuilding is to be placed with the “non-liberal Other”, which is 
neither culturally nor politically responsive to liberal transformation. This amounts to 
what Chandler calls an “uncritical critique”: by offering a “critique” that aligns with 
the policy-makers’ diagnosis of the problem, and thus offers support and consolida-
tion to policy-makers, the critique ends up being “apologia” rather than a radical cri-
tique.
6
 
The ‘liberal peace’ framework is characterized by confidence in reason and 
modern science and despair exemplified by divergent critiques of the ever-renewed 
failures of statebuilding. The roots of this despair do not simply arise out of the onto-
logical gap between universal and particular, but rather out of the subject matter: 
studying human interaction unavoidably involves reflectivity, volition, and most of all 
power. Thus, between what Morgenthau would call our two moods of confidence and 
                                                 
4
 For the more problem oriented approach see, for example: Chesterman, Simon Michael Ignatieff and 
Ramesh Thakur, (2005) Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance (New York: 
UN University Press); Dobbins, James et al., (2007) The Beginners’ Guide to Nation-Building (Santa 
Monica, CA.: RAND Corporation); Paris, Roland and Timothy Sisk (eds.) (2009) The Dilemmas of 
Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (London: Routledge) 
5
 Indeed the ‘idea-based’ critiques can be read as falling under the ‘problem-solving’ approach. See, 
Chandler, David (2010) ‘The uncritical critique of “liberal peace”’, Review of International Studies 36, 
pp. 137–155 
6
 Ibid, pp. 145-155 
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despair; between the attempts of finding a ‘silver bullet’ and constructing a critique 
that not merely reaches the same conclusions as the policy-makers’, there arises a 
knowledge-gap in the statebuilding literature: why, despite the substantial efforts of 
theorizing and critiquing, does the lack of success persist in international statebuild-
ing efforts? The scientism of the ‘liberal peace’ framework needs to be transcended 
conceptually – so too its apologetic critiques. It would seem that there is need for a 
new framework for conceptualizing not only how statebuilding can succeed, but also 
how this unhelpful dichotomy between ‘problem solving’ and ‘approaches critical’ 
approaches can be transcended. Social science is about critically engaging with exist-
ing practices while at the same time solving our social problems. 
Meta-theoretical and philosophical at the outset, the aim of this dissertation is 
to develop such a framework for the study of the practice of international statebuild-
ing. Methodologically, this framework will be constructed along the axis of to interre-
lated themes: The Aristotelian concept of phronésis – ‘practical wisdom’ on how to 
inquire and act on social problems in a particular context –, and the concept on which 
Foucault, in the last years his life, devoted a greater degree of attention: parrhésia – ‘a 
mode of being’ in which truth is tied to the ontological commitment of a subject utter-
ing it. While both themes originate in Ancient Greek texts, and as such address the 
different problems of governing the city-state, the aim is not to resurrect the past, nor 
about what has been lost, but to investigate the past so in order to learn something 
about the present. 
By exploring these two themes, I intend to construct, what Foucault terms, a 
“grid of analysis” – that is, a grid that makes an “analytic of power relations” possi-
 4 
 
ble.
7
 Accordingly, the grid will be made up of three poles, where both themes con-
tribute components to each pole. Aristotle, in The Nicomachean Ethics, contrasted 
phronésis with two other types of intellectual virtues: epistemé and techné. Similarly, 
Foucault situates the notion of (political) parrhésia between the distinct problems of 
politeia and dunesteia. In each pole the two themes will possess similar qualities and 
share a degree of subject matter. The three poles are defined as Phronésis/Parrhésia, 
Epistemé/Politeia, and Techné/Dunesteia.  
The dissertation is just as much a study of phronésis and parrhésia as it is of 
statebuilding. Chapter one will explore the theme of phronésis, from Aristotle’s initial 
formulations throughout its development in retreat, giving way to considerations in 
epistemé (the Aristotelian ban on ‘science of the singular’), and further to the contem-
porary representations of its rediscovery and renewed formulations in Bent 
Flyvbjerg’s argument for a phronetic social science. Chapter two will engage with 
Foucault’s lectures on parrhésia. First, I will expand on the general framing of Fou-
cault’s intellectual project and the basic meanings of parrhésia. Before turning to the 
bulk of the chapter, which will deal with the political variant of parrhésia. Lastly, the 
crisis of political parrhésia throughout its transformation into philosophical parrhésia 
will be briefly discussed. Chapter three will attempt to co-align the two themes and 
discuss the synergies and similarities within them so as to end up with an analytical 
grid; even so, no attempt at reconciliation between phronésis and parrhésia will be 
made. On the basis of this newly constructed analytical grid, chapter four, will com-
prise a short genealogy of the statebuilding literature from the 90’s and onwards. 
Hopefully this will enable a critical understanding of where the international 
statebuilding project, in strictly academic terms, has stranded. It is argued that for 
                                                 
7
 Foucault, Michel (1980) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977, ed-
ited by Colin Gordon (Brighton: Harvester Press) p. 199 
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statebuilding to be successful, the statebuilding literature has to move in the direction 
of phronésis and parrhésia. 
  
 6 
 
Phronésis: Real Social Science 
In The Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle sets out to answer the ethical question “what is 
good for man?”, first asked by Socrates and Plato.8 In contrast to them, however, Ar-
istotle considered the study of ethics (as well as politics) to be practical, rather then 
theoretical: it is about ‘becoming’ and ‘being’ good, rather than knowing what it is to 
be good.
9
 Therefore inquiry starts with looking at what people are doing, rather than 
starting from universals. For Aristotle, virtue has to do with the proper functioning of 
a thing: i.e. an ear is only a functional ear in so far it can hear, because the function of 
the ear is to hear. Adopting this functionalistic view he reasoned that for humans this 
proper function was to be eudaimonia, usually translated as happiness or wellbeing. 
The topic of Aristotle’s ethics therefore is the question of how does humans become 
eudaimonia – the nature of happiness. Of particular interest to this dissertation, how-
ever, is Aristotle’s tripartite categorisation of the “intellectual virtues”: epistemé, 
techné, and phronésis, elaborated in Book IV. These three intellectual virtues will 
constitute the first theme of my analytical argument.
10
 
Epistemé, to Aristotle, is concerned with the universal, the invariable, and the 
context-independent. What is central is a general analytical rationality that is capable 
of demonstrating what is known. In other words, the production of knowledge, which 
is consistent in both, time and space. In this sense epistemé denotes a form of know 
why or know that; ergo, it is demonstrable and therefore eternal: “the object of scien-
                                                 
8
 Aristotle (2004) The Nicomachean Ethics, translated by J. A. K. Thomson (London: Penguin Books) 
9
 Thus, for Aristotle there is talk of the “ethical-political” – the study of one implies the study of the 
other. Richard Bernstein echoes Aristotle in arguing that; ”we cannot understand ethics without think-
ing through our political commitments and responsibilities.” see Bernstein, Richard (1985) Beyond 
Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia, PA: University of Penn-
sylvania Press), p. 9 
10
 Although the reintroduction of phronésis into the broader social science in relatively new there still 
is a good body of literature on the subject: Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism; Garver, Eu-
gene (1987) Machiavelli and the History of Prudence (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press); 
Nichols, Ray (1996)‘Maxims, “Practical Wisdom,” and the Language of Action: Beyond Grand Theo-
ry’, Political Theory 24:4, pp. 687-705; Leslie Paul Thiele (2006) The Heart of Judgment: Practical 
Wisdom, Neuroscience, and Narrative, (New York: Cambridge University Press) 
 7 
 
tific knowledge is of necessity. Therefore it is eternal [...] Induction introduces us to 
first principles and universals, while deduction starts from universals [...] Thus scien-
tific knowledge is a demonstrative state (i.e., a state of mind capable of demonstrating 
what it knows).”11 
Epistemé is a very well known concept to us today, because it corresponds to 
our modern ideal of science, which has become dominant in our intellectual tradition. 
This is a result of its forefathers, Socrates and Plato, who can be said to have priori-
tized this type of intellectual virtue over others; even more so, if we emphasise their 
devotion to ideal theory. Socrates first introduced three criteria for ideal theory in the 
sense that it must be explicit, universal, and abstract. Descartes and Kant added two 
more: ideal theory must be discrete – it must rely on context-independent elements in 
its formulation – and systematic – it must constitute a whole or bounded realm where 
context-independent elements are related by rules or laws. Later, in the natural sci-
ences, a sixth criterion was added: ideal theorizing must be complete which enables it 
to be predictive.
12
 Although the criteria are not fully reachable, it is this view of sci-
ence that has helped epistemé become the most important intellectual virtue in West-
ern societies. 
In a sense techné represents the opposite of epistemé in that it is concerned 
with the particular, the variable and the context-dependent. In contrast to epistemé’s 
know that, techné denotes a form of know how – how to produce certain things or out-
comes. Techné is concerned with “fabrication” (poiesis). Aristotle explains, con-
trasting techné and epistemé: “Every art is concerned with bringing something into 
being, and the practice of an art is the study of how to bring into being something that 
                                                 
11
 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, p. 148 [1139b] 
12
 Dreyfus, Hubert (1982) ‘Why Studies of Human Capacities, modelled on Ideal Natural Science can 
never Achieve their Goal’, rev. edition of paper presented at The Boston Colloquium for the Philoso-
phy of Science, October 1982  
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is capable either of being or of not being [...] For it is not with things that are or come 
to be of necessity that art is concerned [this is the domain of epistemé] nor with natu-
ral objects (because these have their origin in themselves) [...] Art [...] operate[s] in 
the sphere of the variable.”13 As such, techné is an art or craft, where practical instru-
mental rationality is governed by a conscious goal – “the process bringing something 
into being” – without the consideration of whether or not to do so. 
Whereas epistemé and techné have contemporary corresponding terms, 
phronésis has none, but is usually translated as ‘prudence’, ‘practical common sense’, 
or ‘practical wisdom’.14 Phronésis is different from the theoretical know that concern 
of epistemé and the technical know how of techné in that it is concerned with practical 
knowledge and practical ethics. Aristotle defines phronésis as follows: 
 
We may grasp the nature of [phronésis] if we consider what sort of people we call 
prudent. Well, it is thought to be the mark of a prudent man to be able to deliberate 
rightly about what is good and advantageous […] But nobody deliberates about 
things that are invariable […] So […] prudence cannot be science or art; not science 
[epistemé] because what can be done is a variable (it may be done in different ways, 
or not done at all), and not art [techné] because action and production are generically 
different. For production aims at an end other than itself; but this is impossible in the 
case of action, because the end is merely doing well. What remains, then, is that it is a 
true state, reasoned, and capable of action with regard to things that are good or bad 
for man […] We consider that this quality belongs to those who understand the man-
agement of households or states.
15
 
 
In other words, Aristotle, by contrasting phronésis with epistemé – being concerned 
with the particular and variable rather than universal and necessary – and with techné 
– being concerned with “action” rather than “production” (poiesis) –, shows a new 
starting point for analysis and the conduct of human affairs. Phronésis is about the 
exploration of ethics and values because it considers “things that are good or bad for 
                                                 
13
 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, p. 149 [1140a] 
14
 However, ‘prudence’ does not capture the meaning that well, because it in modern English it has 
canonisations with circumspection, cautiousness, and to some extent passivity. 
15
 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, p. 150 [1140a-1140b] 
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man” as the departure for action. As such, Aristotle places phronésis at the intersec-
tion of the universal and the particular, and the general and the concrete. It necessi-
tates consideration, judgment and experience. Phronésis can never be equated to epis-
temé, because it is knowledge about what the course of action is in particular circum-
stances (i.e. a sense of what is ethically practical), which cannot be reduced to general 
truths or universals. Universals, such as theoretical axioms, are to be considered in 
relation to the particular circumstances of the situation. Although techné and 
phronésis both involve skills and judgment, phronésis is not a higher form of techné 
in that it is about value judgments, not production. Furthermore, where experience in 
the case of techné is about rules – experience in the case of phronésis is about judg-
ment. 
Because phronésis in concerned with conduct and “conduct has its sphere in 
particular circumstances” the emphasis must be placed at the particular and the cir-
cumstantial. Aristotle explains that this is “why some people who do not possess theo-
retical knowledge are more effective in action […] than others who do possess it”, 
which is even more true if they have experience.
16
 Phronésis therefore most of all re-
quires experience. Aristotle illustrates this with the unorthodox example of eating 
chicken. By contrasting one person who possesses abstract knowledge – that “light 
flesh foods are digestible and wholesome” – but who is unaware of “what kinds are 
light”, with another person “who knows that chicken is wholesome” and therefore is 
more likely to produce health.
 17
 It important to acknowledge that phronésis does not 
shy away from theoretical knowledge and abstract principles, but there is, on the other 
hand, no substitute for worldly experience; one must get one’s hands dirty and not just 
read books. Aristotle clarifies this point by saying that “although [people] develop 
                                                 
16
 Ibid, p. 156 [1142a] 
17
 Ibid, p. 154 [1141b] 
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ability in geometry and mathematics and become wise in such matters, they are not 
thought to develop [phronésis].”18 
Furthermore, for Aristotle, it was the development of a society’s phronésis 
vis-à-vis its epistemé and techné that was the most important aspect of the political 
science. This is because phronésis is a balancing act between the universal and the 
particular with its own guiding question of what is good and bad for man at the centre 
of its deliberation in particular circumstances. In fact, a well-functioning society for 
Aristotle was dependent on the successful functioning of epistemé, techné, and 
phronésis. However, as the former two cannot manage themselves, Aristotle empha-
sised the role of phronésis claiming that “for the possession of the single virtue of 
[phronésis] will carry with it the possession of them all.”19 I shall elaborate on the 
link between phronésis and political science in chapter three, when discussing 
phronésis in relation to parrhésia. 
 
Developments after Aristotle: 
Since Aristotle and the ancient Greeks a series of developments occurred in our way 
of thinking about knowledge. Of these, the most important was arguably in moderni-
ty. Thinkers, such as Martin Heidegger and Michel Foucault, have examined the radi-
cal transformation in our understanding of ‘being’ that occurred in modernity. In this 
subject-centred understanding, which originated in Descartes and Kant, they note that 
Man objectifies everything, including himself. Here, Man becomes a theorized object, 
an epistemic object of which one can obtain universal knowledge. Consequently, this 
humanistic understanding of ‘being’ makes way for the domination of the instrumen-
                                                 
18
 Ibid, pp. 155-156 [1142a] 
19
 Ibid, p. 166 [1145a] 
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tal rationalities of epistemé and techné while value rational concerns are more or less 
retracted form society.
20
 
This is reflected in the modern social sciences, where Max Weber was one of 
the first to study what could be called the “Rationalist Turn.”21 Weber examined what 
he termed occidental rationality – the “specific and peculiar rationalism” of the West 
– that limited the notion of rationality to an instrumental one.22 He found that, while 
instrumental rationality (Wertrationaltät) had become the dominant way to under-
stand humans and their world, value-rationality (Zweckrationalität) had faded into the 
background of social scientific inquiry. Here, Weber spoke of the “disenchantment of 
the world” in the sense that the consequences of the dominance of this instrumental 
rationality were the alienation and erosion of more traditional values.
23
 
While it might seem that elements of phronésis have long perished in our 
modern culture, the notion has proved more resilient than so. Hans J. Morgenthau was 
an extensive reader of Aristotle and exemplified elements of phronésis in his writings 
on international politics and diplomacy.
24
 However, the notion of phronésis remained 
somewhat implicit in his writing. With disciplines, such as economics, striving for the 
prestige of the epistemic natural sciences throughout the twentieths century, there 
now is a ‘phronetic turn’ underway in the social sciences. 
                                                 
20
 For this short point see, Dreyfus, Hubert (1996) ‘Being and power: Heidegger and Foucault’ Interna-
tional Journal of Philosophical Studies 4:1, pp. 1-16  
21
 Flyvbjerg, Bent (1993) ‘Aristotle, Foucault, and Progressive Phronesis: Outline of an Applied Ethics 
for Sustainable Development’, in Earl Winkler and Jerrold Coombs (eds.), Applied Ethics: A Reader 
(New York: Basil Blackwell), pp. 11-27 
22
 Weber, Max (2003) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, translated by Talcott Parsons 
(New York: Dover Publications, INC.), p. 26 
23
 Koshul, Basit Bilal (2005) The postmodern significance of Max Weber's legacy: disenchanting dis-
enchantment (London: Macmillan), p. 11 
24
 On Morgenthau see: Lang, Anthony F. Jr. (2007) ‘Morgenthau, agency, and Aristotle’, in Williams, 
Michael C. Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans J. Morgenthau in International relations (New 
York: Oxford University Press), pp. 18-41 
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In his book Making Social Science Matter, Bent Flyvbjerg questions the valid-
ity and desirability of modelling the social science on epistemic natural sciences.
25
 
While the natural sciences, given their subject matter, are successful as epistemic sci-
ences – that is, by testing hypothesis, producing abstract principles and accurate pre-
dictions – the social sciences are not. This is because the social sciences study human 
interaction, which necessarily involves human consciousness, choice, power and re-
flexivity. They are better at producing situational knowledge that enables action in 
particular and contextual settings based on a deliberation of values and interests – i.e. 
phronésis. Thus, whereas social sciences has contributed little in terms of being a sta-
ble and accumulating epistemic science, the natural sciences has added little to our 
reflexive analysis of interests, power and values: “[I]n their role as phronésis, the so-
cial sciences are strongest where the natural sciences are weakest.”26 Flyvbjerg there-
fore argues for an alternative social science, which is based on phronésis rather then 
epistemé. 
 While phronésis in today’s society, in principle, would be capable of balanc-
ing instrumental and value rationality, it has noticeable difficulty in making itself ef-
fective in political reality. This is because it lacks the inclusion of power, as Richard 
Bernstein points out: “[N]o practical discussion is going to take place unless you un-
derstand the relevance of phronésis. But no practical philosophy can be adequate for 
our time unless it confronts the analysis of power.”27 Thus it became Flyvbjerg’s aim 
to develop the Aristotle’s classic concept of phronésis to incorporate mechanisms of 
power.
28
 
                                                 
25
 Flyvbjerg,
 
Bent (2001) Making Social Science Matter: Why social inquiry fails and how it can suc-
ceed again, translated by Steven Sampson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
26
 Ibid, p. 3 
27
 Bernstein, Richard (1989) ‘Interpretation and Solidarity’, an interview by Dunja Melcic, Praxis In-
ternational 9:3, p. 217 
28
 Flyvbjerg, Making Social Science Matter, p. 55 
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Through an engagement with Nietzsche and Foucault’s ideas of genealogy as 
the methodology with which the wirkliche Historie (real history) of the social realm 
can be “written”, Flyvbjerg aims to study politics in terms of Realpolitik and rationali-
ty in terms of Realrationalität (real rationality). Differentiating between two ap-
proaches to power – that of “power as entity” and “power as force relation” –, 
Flyvbjerg prioritizes the latter Nietzschean-Foucauldian tradition over the former 
Weberian-Dahlian one.
29
 Maintaining that studying power in the contemporary world 
inevitably involves real people doing things to other people, the ‘power as entity’ tra-
dition, although problematic, remains indispensable. Therefore, Flyvbjerg comes up 
with a compromise and asks, “what are the most immediate and most local power re-
lations operating, and how do they operate?”30  
To Aristotle, the classic concept of phronésis departed from a series of value 
rational questions. These questions are here supplemented with Flyvbjerg’s inclusion 
of questions of power (question two):  
 
(1) Where are we going? 
(2) Who wins and who loses; by which mechanisms of power? 
(3) Is this desirable? 
(4) What, if anything, can we do about it?
31
 
 
Doing social science in this manner is to do phronetic social science, or “progressive 
phronesis,” as Flyvbjerg calls it, to emphasise the contemporariness of the project.32 
In one of his last chapters – remaining in Aristotle’s tradition of ‘prioritising the par-
ticular’ – Flyvbjerg sketches out methodological guidelines for this reformed social 
science.
33
 First, phronetic social science focuses on values. As outlined by Aristotle 
the purpose of phronésis is to balance instrumental rationality with value rationality 
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by applying situational ethics. In this commitment to contextualism, both foundation-
alism based in epistemé (universalism) and relativism based in techné (particularism) 
are rejected. Second, place power at the centre of analysis. With a Foucauldian con-
ception of power, Flyvbjerg proposes a compromise of combining the Weberian ques-
tion of “who governs?” with the Nietzchean question of “what ‘governmental ration-
alities’ are at work when those who govern govern?”34  
Third, Flyvbjerg argues for the importance for “getting close to reality.”35 To 
avoid the charge of irrelevance (the question of “so what?”) research should be based 
on the context that is studied. The researcher must be close to the practice that is stud-
ied, but at the same time keep his ethical distance. Fourth, emphasizing the little 
things. Phronetic studies begin with the little questions of empirical origin, which fo-
cus on the particulars before the general, as opposed to the type of inquiry, which has 
its outset in “big questions” and important issue. Fifth, looking at practice before dis-
course. The study of practical rationality and knowledge in the actions of everyday 
practices takes presidency over attention to discourse and theory – from the household 
to the complexity of international statebuilding. Sixth, the phronetic researcher studies 
cases and contexts. It is by focusing on case-studies, precedents and exemplars that 
the practical rationality and judgement of phronésis is best brought to light. Seventh, 
asking the question of “how” and doing narrative. Aimed at both understanding and 
explaining, phronetic research prioritises the dynamic question of “how” as opposed 
to the structural question of “why?” As such, a narrative constitutes an explanation.36 
Eight, linking agency and structure. Inspired by Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of 
“habitus” – “the internalization of externality and the externalization of internality” –, 
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phronetic social science attempts to transcend the dualisms of agent/structure and 
hermeneutics/structuralism.
37
 Rather than the two standing in an external relation to 
each other, it is emphasised that there is critical relation between both agents and 
structures where one is impossible to comprehend without simultaneously compre-
hending the other. Finally, doing dialogue with a polyphony of voices. Rejecting any 
claim to a final truth or authority (ultimate or verified knowledge), phronetic asser-
tions are socially and inter-subjective conditioned. Thus, rather than producing theo-
retical knowledge about the social world, “the task of phronetic social science”, 
Flyvbjerg tells us, “is to clarify and deliberate about the problems and risks we face 
and to outline how things may be done differently, in full knowledge that we cannot 
and ultimate answers to these questions or even a single version of what the questions 
are.”38 
The confidence in an epistemic social science, and its ability to solve the so-
cial problems, has been dominant in the practise of international statebuilding efforts. 
Where the confidence in epistemic social science is based on its devotion to end re-
sults or output, phronésis is about process.
39
 Thus, phronetic social science offers no 
‘silver bullets’, but rather a dialogical stance in which practical wisdom is applied to 
an ever-changing social context. This kind of ‘power research’ might not be quantifi-
able, but it nevertheless remains key to enhancing the practical wisdom with which 
statebuilding efforts ought to be guided. Thus, to conclude this chapter, the way out of 
the ever-renewed despair of the failure of scientific reasoning to solve the problems of 
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international statebuilding is grounded on a move to phronésis and phronetic social 
science.  
Nevertheless, Flyvbjerg takes certain aspects of phronésis as a given. While 
the proper functioning of social science might be envisioned as a critique and social 
commentary directed by a desire to clarify different values and interest in the public 
sphere, there is no direct link to how this leads to the activist type of scholar ship 
Flyvbjerg seems to be committed to.
40
 In short, is phronésis an intellectual virtue, or is 
it more than that, a practise? A practice, that is, a particular way in which one con-
ducts oneself as a social scientist. The question of practice and the relation of 
phronésis and power can only be discussed relative to the practice through which one 
makes one’s phronésis valid in social life. 
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Parrhésia: The Practice of Truth-telling 
In the last years of his life, Michel Foucault held a series of lectures on Parrhésia, a 
concept that originated in Greco-Roman antiquity. Two were held at The Collège de 
France, titled The Government of Self and Others in 1982-1983 and The Courage of 
Truth in 1983-1984, with the addition of a third lecture series held at the University of 
California at Berkley in 1983, published as Fearless Speech.
41
 
 Foucault started his lectures by summarizing his general project as “a history 
of thought” by which he means the “focal points of experience” in “which forms of a 
possible knowledge (savoir), normative frameworks of behaviour for individuals, and 
potential modes of existence for possible subjects are linked together” comes into his-
torical being.
 42
 Foucault gives the example of madness, which he studies in The His-
tory of Madness. This first involved treating madness as a point from which a “body 
of knowledge” could be formed (knowledge); and then as a “set of norm”, first as 
norm corresponding to the phenomenon of madness and second how these norm devi-
ated from normal individuals (power); and last how the experience of madness de-
fined the constitution of the “subject’s modes of being”, that of the normal subject 
opposed to the mad subject (subjectivation).
43
 Roughly these constitute the Foucaulti-
an triangle of knowledge, power, and subjectivation.  
Foucault describes his general project as having studied all three poles as sep-
arate “genealogies.”44 Thus, first of all, it has entailed a detailed study of the different 
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‘forms of veridiction’. Rather than studying the substances of knowledge of different 
points in time, Foucault set out to study the different forms of knowledge constituted 
by the “discursive practices” which organize and gives the rules to a game of true and 
false.
45
 Second, it has entailed the study of ‘procedures of governmentality’. Rather 
than focusing on the institutions of power and their actions, Foucault wanted to study 
the “techniques and procedures” that constituted the strategic situation in which one 
attempt to conduct the conduct of others.
46
 Third, it involved ‘forms of subjectifica-
tion’. Rather than a theory of the subject, Foucault studied the “different forms by 
which the individual is led to constitute him or herself as subject.” 47 In fact, Foucault, 
in all the incidents, insisted on the impossibility of a theory of the subject, of power, 
and of knowledge. 
The specific concern raised in the last lecture series involves one such “focal 
point of experience”, one such mode of being, namely parrhésia.48 “You can see” 
Foucault tells us, “that with parrhésia we have a notion which is situated at the meet-
ing point of the obligation to speak the truth, procedures and techniques of govern-
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mentality, and the constitution of the relationship to self.”49 Surely, the intention was 
to write a history of such a mode of being; as it appeared in Greco-Roman Antiquity 
and further on throughout its reappearance in Western history and though. 
After Foucault’s ‘ethical turn’ in his writings on The History of Sexuality, the 
lectures at the Collège de France stand out because they yet again link êthos to the 
political – after they were spilt apart in late Roman society. 50 This linking can be de-
scribed as an “ethical politics” in which care of self and the relation to, or “govern-
ment” of, others are strictly interrelated. In an interview, Foucault explained the cru-
cial link drawn by the Greeks: “Ethos implies also a relation with others to the extent 
that care for self renders one competent to occupy a place in the city, in the communi-
ty or in interindividual relationships which are proper – whether it be to exercise a 
magistracy or to have friendly relationships.”51 Indeed, rather than representing a re-
treat from the engagement with the problems of modernity, Foucault’s interest in 
parrhésia signifies a desire to confront modern political thought and philosophy. The 
basis for an ethical politics was not to be found in modernity. By re-functioning truth-
telling as an important subject for contemporary political theory and philosophy Fou-
cault was seeking a basis for his ethical politics project. Here, with a focus on the 
Greek’s problematization of truth-telling, or parrhésia, Foucault offers an alternative 
and heterodox reading of Ancient texts aimed at the problems of the present. Accord-
ingly, in his first lecture series, The Government of Self and Others, Foucault studied 
the development from political parrhésia to philosophical parrhésia. The second, The 
Courage of Truth, was devoted mostly to philosophical parrhésia – or the tension be-
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tween Platonic and Cynic parrhésia – while the lectures given at Berkley were mostly 
concerned with detailing different aspects of parrhésia. Indeed, over the course of the 
three lecture series’, Foucault’s heterodox readings of Euripides’s Ion, Thucydides’ 
reconstructions of Pericles’s speeches before the Athenian assembly, Plato’s letters 
describing his political experiences in Syracuse, the figure of Socrates in the Apology 
and the Gorgias, the political writings of Plato and Aristotle in The Republic or Poli-
tics, and a whole range of different Greek tragedies, represents a major confrontation 
to modern political though and philosophy. 
In methodological terms, Foucault was less interested in epistemological 
structures than what he called “alethurgic forms.”52 Where the study of epistemologi-
cal structures are concerned with claims of knowledge – establishing if they were cor-
rect or not –, the study of ‘alethurgic’ forms is interested in “the production of truth or 
the act by which truth is manifested.”53 This is the approach taken by Foucault in his 
study of parrhésia: “My intention was not to deal with the problem of truth, but with 
the problem of truth-teller or truth-telling as an activity”, and he continues, “What I 
wanted to analyse was how the truth-teller’s role was variously problematized in 
Greek philosophy.”54 A comparison with the theme of phronésis is in order here. For 
in a way, this approach underpins the shift from Foucault’s early emphasis on epis-
temé, in The Order of Things, to techné – present in The Archaeology of Knowledge – 
that was directed from the standpoint of phronésis. In other words, Foucault has, in 
every instance, focussed his studies towards classical phronetic concerns such as 
goals, values, interests, and praxis.
55
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The notion Parrhésia:  
The word parrhésia is normally translated into English as ‘free speech’  – as in, speak-
ing freely of being out spoken. Parrhésia therefore signifies a degree of ‘free-
spokenness’ in one’s attitude towards others; the parrhesiastes is a person who uses 
parrhésia. But parrhésia also designates a form of, or the practice of, truth-telling. 
That is: truth-telling as virtue, in both political and moral terms. Not to reduce it to a 
technique or skill, like rhetoric, “parrhésia”, Foucault explains, “is a stance, a way of 
being which is akin to a virtue, a mode of action.”56 Because any such truth-telling 
requires the presence of an other, there is always a relationship of power between the 
subject who speaks the truth and the other. Thus, to Foucault there is a close link be-
tween truth and parrhésia in because “the role of this other is precisely to tell the 
truth, to tell the whole truth, or at any rate to tell all the truth that is necessary, and to 
tell it in a certain form which is precisely parresia.”57 
According to Foucault, parrhésia has five characteristics: First, parrhésia is 
characterised by frankness. That is, the parrhesiastes says everything he has in mind 
and as such nothing goes unspoken, so that the audience can grasp precisely what the 
speaker has in mind. The parrhesiastes does this in a way so that he makes it clear 
that what is said is his own opinion and he does so without technical aids. In contrast 
again to rhetoric, Foucault explains: “Whereas rhetoric provides the speaker with 
technical devices to help him prevail upon the minds of his audience (regardless of 
the rhetorician's own opinion concerning what he says), in parrhésia, the parrhesias-
tes acts on other people's mind by showing them as directly as possible what he actu-
ally believes.”58 
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Second, in parrhésia, the parrhesiastes’s relation to truth is very different to 
our modern way of understanding truth (in terms of proof); what could be called the 
Cartesian ‘mode of veridiction’. Foucault explains: “the parrhesiastes says what is 
true because he knows that it is true; and he knows that it is true because it is really 
true.”59 Hence, in a way, there is always “an exact coincidence between belief and 
truth”, Foucault elaborates.60 The only measure of truth in parrhésia would be the 
courage of the speaker, and therefore “what binds the speaker to the fact that what he 
says is the truth, and to the consequences which follow from the fact that he has told 
the truth.”61 Thus, there is a kind of ontological commitment on behalf of the speaker 
to which he is tied to the truth. 
Consequently, third, parrhésia entails a degree of risk and danger and there-
fore requires courage. Contrasting parrhésia to other “discursive strategies” such as 
rational demonstration, persuasion, teaching, and debating, Foucault shows that what 
distinguishes parrhésia from all of them is the risk of danger inherent in parrhésia. 
Thus, to be a parrhesiastes requires the necessary courage to tell the truth, even if this 
means death. Foucault explains this by stating: “Parrhésia, then, is linked to courage 
in the face of danger: it demands the courage to speak the truth in spite of some dan-
ger.”62 Consequently, people with power can never speak truth in the parrhesiatic 
sense; it requires no courage to speak out from a position of power. Either to a tyrant 
or to the assembly, when one is being a parrhesiastes there is always a risk of danger, 
either in the form of humiliation, exile or death.  
Fourth, parrhésia is a form of criticism. Because the danger or risk involved in 
parrhésia comes from the speaker confronting the other, or the interlocutor. Foucault 
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therefore describes this relation as the “game of truth” between the two parties. Thus, 
parrhésia is a form of criticism because it is “either towards another or towards one-
self, but always in a situation where the speaker or confessor is in a position of inferi-
ority with respect to the interlocutor.”63 Foucault describes a criticism that comes 
from ‘below’ which is directed towards ‘above’. The parrhesiastes is less powerful 
than the one to which he speaks to. This is the situation in which the philosopher risks 
angering the tyrant by confronting him with his way of ruling. 
Fifth, parrhésia is characterised by a sense of duty. That is, telling the truth is 
thought of as a duty: “No one forces him to speak; but he feels that it is his duty to do 
so.”64 Foucault distinguishes between whether or not one is “compelled” to speak the 
truth, i.e. under torture or in a trail, and the sort of voluntary confession of the truth 
that is inspired by a sense of moral obligation towards a friend (in a political situation 
such as the city state, or to a king). Parrhésia therefore requires freedom or in other 
words: abiding to a sense of duty under conditions of freedom. Summing these five 
characteristics up Foucault notes: “In parrhesia, the speaker uses his freedom and 
chooses frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the risk 
of death instead of life and security, criticism instead of flattery, and moral duty in-
stead of self-interest and moral apathy.”65 
 
Towards a genealogy of parrhésia in ancient Greece:  
In his 1983 lectures, Foucault for the most part studies parrhésia as a political virtue. 
Parrhésia evolves because of crisis from its democratic form, where one shows his 
courage by addressing the assembly, to an autocratic form, where true discourse in-
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stead is spoken to the king to help him direct his kingdom. Foucault study of political 
parrhésia shows us, largely, that the Greek secret of politics, of the search for the best 
regime, is concerned, not with constitutional frameworks, but in reconciling the prin-
ciple of ‘ethical difference’ with the problem of government of others. This ‘ethical 
difference does not simply consist is excellent leaders or moral quality of individuals, 
but in the process of constructing the relation to self on the basis of the difference of 
truth. That is, the truth as difference, in reproaching others and the prevailing public 
opinion in speaking the truth. 
In his studies of Euripides’ Ion and Polybius’ texts, Foucault locates a “fun-
damental circularity” between parrhésia and democracy in that “for there to be de-
mocracy there must be parrhésia; for there to be parrhésia there must be democra-
cy.” 66  It is within this circularity that Foucault placed his analysis of political 
parrhésia. Here, political parrhésia is the exercise of free speech operating within an 
antagonistic structure of competing individuals, determining who is most fit to govern 
based on the subject’s constitutive relation to the self and the relation to others. This 
was to take charge of the city via the discourse of truth (or the practice of truth-
telling) – “polei kai logõ khrēstai” – or according to Foucault: “What I think is asso-
ciated with the game of parresia is speaking the truth in order to direct the city, in a 
position of superiority in which one is perpetually jousting with others.”67 Political 
parrhésia is therefore rooted in what Foucault calls “politics as experience” – desig-
nated by the Greek term dunesteia (which derives from dunamis: strength, power, or 
the exercise of power), rather than any organizational or institutional framework – 
termed politeia (the constitution). To bring this point home, Foucault formalised the 
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game of parrhésia into what he calls the “constitutive rectangle” of political 
parrhésia, which is stretched out between four conditions.  
The first condition is the “formal condition of democracy”, or isēgoria – the 
constitution, the politeia – especially the constitutional condition which gives citizens 
the equal right to speak.
68
 Foucault describes us a whole series of problems associated 
with the politeia: What are the rights of the citizens? How decisions are to be taken? 
How power should be rightfully exercised? How leaders are appointed? Are all equal-
ly accountable to the law? All the different sets of formalities that is associated with 
configuring a constitution. In short, it is the problem of the framework for political 
action, of authority and legitimacy: Who is to rule? How should power be constitut-
ed? Who can speak in the assembly? Who has the right to vote and who does not? The 
problems of politeia are, in a way, very known to us because they are in a sense the 
basis of Western political thought. Political philosophy and political science has, to a 
large extend, been concerned with ideal social models of statehood, abstract models, 
and utopian theories regarding the best functioning model of the state in accordance 
with first principles. In this context, Foucault talked about a “morphological definition 
of democracy” in the sense that democracy is differentiated from monarchy, aristoc-
racy, and oligarchy in so far that the people who govern it, as opposed to the charac-
teristics and qualities that make democracy function well.
69
 
The second condition is the “de facto condition” or the concrete exercise of 
power (of dunesteia), where the ascendancy or superiority of some enables them to 
address others and speak the truth and to persuade them so that they, in effect, exer-
cise command over them.
70
 Like politeia, there is a series of problems associated with 
dunesteia: The problem of how power is exercised, or the political game - “the game 
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through which power is actually exercised in a democracy.”71 They are the problems 
concerning the procedures, techniques, and practices of exercising power. In Greek 
society, contrary to the contemporary exercise of power, these are essentially limited 
to what Foucault called ‘true discourse’, which is only effective if it succeeds to per-
suade. Finally, dunesteia is “the problem of the nature of political man himself”, his 
character, quality, and moral conduct.
 72
 It is especially his relationship to himself 
and to others, the people he is governing, which extremely important to Foucault. Fur-
thermore, dunesteia is also the problem of the political game and, in the case of the 
individual, the political man who engages with it. This individual has to face politics 
in a particular way, which Foucault conceptualizes as the problem of politics in gen-
eral: “[U]nderstood as a practice having to obey certain rules, indexed to truth in a 
particular way, and which involves a particular form of relationship to oneself and to 
others on the part of those who play this game.”73 In sum, this political game is char-
acterized by an agonistic structure where the ascendancy of some over others allows 
them to persuade the city with their true discourse; and as such, dunesteia and the 
problems associated with it constitute as a “field of experience” as it concerns the in-
dividuals involved that have experience in such matters.
74
 
Now, the third and fourth conditions, as Foucault describes them, are a bit 
complicated because they each constitute a part of parrhésia, which solely is located 
within those who strive to be the parrhesiastes – the one who tells the truth. The third 
condition is the “truth condition” the speaker is bound to; those who hope to take 
charge of the city must make use of discourse, or the logos, the rational discourse, the 
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discourse of truth.
75
 The fourth condition is the “moral condition” of the speaker to 
this truth; in a democracy the practice of truth-telling is preconditioned by rivalry and 
confrontation, those striving to govern the city must demonstrate their courage.
76
 Here 
we have two of the characteristic described above – truth and risk – which tie the 
speaker ontologically to his true-discourse. Therefore, I would argue that, we should 
think of the two conditions as one. That is, they constitute parrhésia as practice, as an 
alethurgy form. “There is no exercise of power without something like an alethurgy”, 
Foucault tells us, but that alethurgry does not necessarily have to be in the form of 
courageous truth telling; people could be speaking (i.e. flattering) only to ensure their 
own gain.
77
 To borrow a phrase from Thomas Flynn, “all parrhesiasts are truth-
tellers, but not all truth-tellers are parrhesiasts.”78  
By juxtaposing politeia (the formal conditions), dunesteia (the de facto condi-
tions) and the truth and moral conditions, which linked together constitute parrhésia, 
we can construct an analytical grid for analysing the power relations of ancient Athe-
nian democracy. This is what Foucault calls ‘politics’ as opposed to the ‘political’. By 
implication of “politics as experience”, a complex relation arises between the prob-
lems of the constitution, the problem of the concrete exercise of power, and the prob-
lems of the practice of telling the truth.
79
 Foucault explains: 
 
[P]arresia is very precisely a notion which serves as the hinge between politeia and dunasteia, 
between the problem of the law and the constitution on the one hand, and the problem of the 
political game on the other. The place of parresia is defined and guaranteed by the politeia; 
but parresia, the truth-telling of the political man, is what ensures the appropriate game of 
politics. The importance of parresia, it seems to me, is found in this meeting point. At any 
rate, it seems to me that we find here the root of a problematic of a society’s immanent power 
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relations which, unlike the juridical-institutional system of that society, ensure that it is actual-
ly governed.
80
 
 
Foucault, here, is challenging the foundations of traditional political philosophy. This 
is because if the juridical-institutional system, the abstract models, the ideal social 
models, and utopian theories about the best functioning model of state are not what 
‘ensures the appropriate game of politics’, then the tremendous efforts to develop 
these complex and sophisticated arguments for how the rule of men can be legitimate, 
provide security and treat the subject justly all seem to be set up around the wrong 
‘condition’. If Foucault’s argument is correct, then the theories of the state proposed 
by Plato and in his tradition have been of questionable value. By linking the govern-
ment of others to the self, to parrhésia, and rooting parrhésia in ‘politics as experi-
ence’, Foucault is able to show that, rather than the best regime-type (i.e. democracy), 
it is ‘the truth-telling of the political man’ that “ensures the appropriate game of poli-
tics … [and that the city] is actually governed.”81 By this standard, defining an opti-
mal mechanism for the distributions of power of a society does not ensure its good 
governance; only the political man’s relation to the self and others is ultimately able 
to do so. 
This is political parrhésia as it is supposed to function and how functioned in 
Athenian democracy in a limited period of time. Foucault draws on the speeches of 
Pericles to give an example of what he calls “good parrhésia.”82 First exemplified in 
the study of The Tragedy of Orestes, the characteristic of “good parrhésia” is a person 
who is “courageous” (andreios), “irreproachable” (akeraios), and “prudent” (he pos-
sesses phronésis). The figure of Pericles, as described by Thucydides in his History of 
the Peloponnesians Wars, was seen as such a person. In the speech before the war 
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broke out, the Athenians called for assemblies so every citizen could make use of 
their right to speak (isēgoria), guaranteed to them by the democratic constitution 
(politeia). “Among the speakers was Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, the leading man 
of his time among the Athenians and the most powerful both in action and in debate” 
and thus made use of his experience and superiority to persuade and direct the Athe-
nians.
83
 Pericles’s speech started as follows: “‘Athenians,’ he said, ‘my views are the 
same as ever: I am against making any concessions to the Peloponnesians.”84 Present-
ing all of the characteristics of a parrhesiastes Pericles delivers his speech: Frankness 
in speaking his mind; tying himself to an ontological commitment to the truth; show-
ing courage by facing the risk and dangers in speaking before the assembly; critically 
engaging with the consequences of the choice for war; and in doing this he is not mo-
tivated by personal gain but by duty. Here, the ascendancy of Pericles, his way of 
constituting himself in relation to himself and others, enabled him to establish a “par-
rhesiatic pact” between him and the people of Athens.85 
After the golden period of Athenian democracy, the period of Pericles and the 
Peloponnesian wars, the erosion of democratic parrhésia began: “The bond between 
parresia and democracy is problematic, difficult, and dangerous. Democracy”, Fou-
cault tells us, “is in the process of being overrun by a bad parresia.”86 The democratic 
parrhésia is facing a crisis and is being replaced by ‘bad parrhésia’. ‘Bad parrhésia’ 
is spoken by demagogues who seeks to flatter the crowd; not true to its own principles 
it seeks persuasion (by rhetoric or appealing to passions) instead of frankness, to tell 
untruths instead of truths, personal safety over risk and courage, flattery instead of 
criticism, and self-interest instead of moral duty. This results in two major experienc-
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es: First, the courage of the speaker is not respected, and it thus becomes too danger-
ous to show one’s courage in speaking the truth; risking death to exercise parrhésia 
would make for a short life in politics. More importantly, second, parrhésia in so far 
as it is understood as the right to speak (isēgoria) is dangerous for democracy. If any-
one can say anything, even the very worst citizens – the bad, the immoral, the incom-
petence or ignorant – may take charge and govern the city with disastrous conse-
quences. Hence, there is a kind of structural failure inherent in democracy, which is 
making room for bad parrhésia, resulting in the break-up of the ‘fundamental circu-
larity’ between parrhésia and democracy. 
Foucault examines two answers to this crisis: the “Platonic reversal” and the 
“Aristotelian hesitation.”87 Aristotle was hesitant in the sense that to him, it was not a 
matter of the form of government but rather of whether whoever governed, did so in 
their own interest or for the best of the city.
88
 Where as to Plato, parrhésia quickly 
became a choice between either democracy or truth-telling. As freedom of speech in-
creasingly was linked to the choice of bios (the way of one’s life), the focus of 
parrhésia shifted from the politeia and dunesteia to that of the psukhē (the soul). The 
individual soul and their ethos would was Plato’s be the concern of truth-telling. He 
therefore proposed a reversal of constituting parrhésia as the defining principle of 
politeia, while carefully excluding democracy (here as isēgoria and isonomia).89 To 
Foucault, these responses signified a change in the Greeks problematization of truth-
telling, in other words; a transformation of political parrhésia was under way, from a 
“Periclean moment” of parrhésia to a “Socratic-Platonic moment”. 90 
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As the bios came to be the centre, the choice of a way of life (the ethos, the 
way in which we are formed as moral subjects), political parrhésia is problematized 
around the relation between the sovereign and his political advisors. Here, the advi-
sors take on the role as the parrhesiastes in an effort to influence and form the sover-
eign’s ethos, so that he controls his kingdom in a non-abusive way. The sovereign 
therefore must be committed to play the parrhésiatic game and accept what the par-
rhesiastes tells him, even if the truth is critical or unpleasant. In this way the sover-
eign’s ethical relation to himself and others, which was the concern of those who took 
charge in democracy, is kept intact. More than that, by limiting the number of souls to 
which truth discourse is addressed, Plato argued, it becomes less complicated to es-
tablish ‘ethical difference’ in an autocracy than a democracy. He described in his VII 
letter how he carried out such an experiment in Syracuse acting as a political advisor 
to the new king Dionysius the Younger. As expected, however, it was a failure: Dio-
nysius did not engage in a parrhesiastic pact and instead tried to have Plato killed. 
Autocratic parrhésia too, remained a dangerous solution. 
This represents a very heterodox reading of Plato, because it is not philoso-
phising as systematizing the contents of knowledge (mathēmata), but rather as a prac-
tice, a mode of being (askēsis) that interested Foucault.91 Here, according to Foucault, 
philosophy finds its reality in an active confrontation with political power; it is not 
philosophy’s objective to test the truth of politics, but to test its own truths in politics. 
That is not to say, however, that the philosopher is a political actor. Philosophy has its 
own particular game to play in relation to politics, the game of ‘ethical differentia-
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tion’.92 In short, philosophical practice is characterized by its “restive exteriority” in 
which it brings ethical differentiation within the exercise of power into play.
93
 
In fact, this redefinition of Greek political thought, centred on ethical differ-
ence and the formation of the ethos of the individual soul, allows Foucault to re-
approach the tradition of Western philosophy. Foucault notes, that this new problem-
atization of parrhésia as a sort of transfiguration of the soul introduces three distinct 
and irreducible ‘realities’ or poles’. Accordingly, Foucault explains how the ancient 
Greek philosophy saw the problems of governing others (the pole of politeia and the 
exercise of power) as rooted in an ethical transformation of the subject (the pole of 
ethos and the subject), which, in turn, is capable of bringing out the difference of truth 
in the relation to the self and (the pole of alētheia, truth and truth-telling).94 “This is 
the parrhesiastic discourse and standpoint in philosophy: it is the discourse of the ir-
reducibility of truth, power, and ethos, and at the same time the discourse of their 
necessary relationship, of the impossibility of thinking truth (alētheia), power 
(politeia), and ethos without their essential, fundamental relationship to each other.”95 
Foucault here comes full circle with what he himself had started in the Foucauldian 
triangle of knowledge, power, subjectification.
96
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An Analytical Framework 
In the last two chapters, the themes of phronésis and parrhésia have been discussed at 
length, in this chapter I wish to explore common grounds or synergies between the 
two themes and their respective sub categories. However, there will be no attempt at 
reconciliation as of yet. There are two instances where the two concepts convene. 
First, when Flyvbjerg argues for an activist social science that confronts praxis with 
its problematizations. Second, where Foucault studies the tragedy of Orestes and Thu-
cydides’ description of Pericles; both Pericles and Orestes posses’ phronésis and 
make use of parrhésia. What emerges, I would argue, is a relation of mutual depend-
ence between the phronésis and parrhésia. That is, on the one hand, for there to be 
good parrhésia there must be phronésis, the parrhesiastes must posses’ phronésis. 
Conversely, on the other, one needs parrhésia to make use of one’s phronésis in pub-
lic. The opposite goes for the practice of bad truth-telling; the absence of phronésis – 
of, what is basically a bad, applied ethic –, the intellectual virtues or rather instrumen-
tal rationalities which are not fit to govern (epistemé and techné), take over. 
Good parrhésia requires phronésis: playing the game of parrhésia requires 
experience; it requires a certain “feel for power games.”97 “The bond between parresia 
and democracy is problematic, difficult, and dangerous”, Foucault tells us, and there-
fore to make parrhésia function well in a democracy the parrhesiastes needs 
phronésis – the experience and “practical wisdom” on how to inquire and act on so-
cial problems in a particular context.
98
 More than that, they need a “reason capable of 
action with regard to things that are good or bad for man.”99 Pericles, Foucault notes, 
was known for his ability to reach a good balance between democracy and parrhésia. 
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What is more, to make use of phronésis in navigating the dangers inherent to the rela-
tion between truth-telling and democracy.
100
 
In so far as phronésis is to be successful, it requires parrhésia; it needs to be 
practiced in the very relations of power that it deliberates. In a recent article, Chris 
Brown points out an interesting paradox between the possession of phronésis and the 
existence of ‘the Other’: “[E]xperience of the world is central to the exercise of prac-
tical reason, but attempts to ‘pull rank’ on the basis of such experience are self-
defeating.”101 Hence, it might seem that phronésis and the choices it involves is al-
ways of good and ethical by nature. As it appears to Brown, “[w]isdom is not some-
thing that can be claimed for oneself – it has to be recognised by others.”102 While this 
remains somewhat of a problem for Aristotle, Flyvbjerg had shown that by adding 
questions of the exercise of power to the concept the problem could be overcome. In 
other words, choices can only be considered good or bad in relation to certain values 
and interests.
103
 To understand this relation better, we have to return to questions of 
power and the space within which one applies phronésis. Nothing in such situations 
could be more important that parrhésia, having the courage to confront power to 
speak one’s practical wisdom. Here, values and interest in the ethical political are 
linked to the care for the self and the relation to others; one can only take care for oth-
ers if one takes care of oneself.  
But then, what about the other aspects outlined with regard to phronésis, epis-
temé and techné; and to parrhésia, politeia and dunesteia? As discussed above, to Ar-
istotle, phronésis is the most important of the intellectual virtues because it is neces-
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sary for the management of human affairs, and it therefore intersects with political 
science: 
 
Political science and prudence [phronésis] are the same state of mind [but not identical: 
phronésis is also necessary for the management of the household or the individual] […] Pru-
dence concerning the state has two aspects: one, which is controlling and directive, is legisla-
tive science; the other […] deals with particular circumstances […] [and] is practical and de-
liberative.
104
 
 
A closer look at Aristotle’s description of political science reveals an interesting cor-
respondence or synergy between the concepts from the last two chapters; epistemé, 
techné, politeia, and dunesteia. The “legislative science” that Aristotle refers to is 
politeia which is concerned with the problem of different frameworks for political 
action or ‘who should rule?’, ‘how should power ideally be constituted?’, and so on. 
While the “other” that deals with “particular circumstances” is dunesteia or dealing 
with the problem of how power is exercised – “the game through which power is ac-
tually exercised in a democracy” –, the procedures, techniques, and practices of exer-
cising power.
 105
 More than that, the types of intellectual virtue presumed to be appro-
priate for the study of each aspect appear to coincide. Of the latter (dunesteia), Aristo-
tle says that it is “practical and deliberative”, comparing the persons that “take part in 
politics” to “artisans.” 106 Thus, concerned with the production of certain things and 
outcomes, the variable and the context-dependent, it is the know how of techné that is 
best suited for dunesteia. While the other aspect (politeia), that which is ‘controlling 
and directive’, is best studied by the know why or know that of epistemé; that univer-
sal, invariable, and context-independent knowledge which makes it possible to scruti-
nize and theorize power into constitutional settings. Based on these parallels and syn-
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ergies, we can very schematically conjugate politeia with epistemé – the constitution-
al and universal – and dunesteia with techné – the exercise of power and the particu-
lar. 
However, as with a parrhésia indexed to dunesteia – the game played by ri-
vals each attempting to persuade with their truth-discourse –, phronésis emphasises 
the particular, the contextual, and experience. Political science, therefore, can impos-
sibly be practised as epistemé and with a focus on politeia alone. As such, the analyti-
cal framework, which I want to construct, must account for and emphasise these 
properties, i.e. the particular and contextual (see below). This is not to say, however, 
that these epistemic and constitutional aspects of political science are not extremely 
important. Without politeia, there would be no right to practice parrhésia, and with-
out epistemé there would no universal knowledge on how to construct a proper consti-
tution. 
 
 
 
However, as observed by Flyvbjerg, there has been a spilt in philosophy and political 
science between the two sides emphasised by Aristotle – between the universal and 
the particular: “One tradition, the dominant one, has developed from Plato via Hobbes 
and Kant to Habermas and other rationalist thinkers, emphasizing the [epistemic and 
politeia] […] The other [techné and the dunesteia] […] has developed via Machiavelli 
 
Phronēsis - Parrhēsia  
Epistemē - Politeia Technē - Dunesteia  
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to Nietzsche, and to Foucault in some interpretations.”107 This same split reflects the 
choice of the object of study taken within these two traditions. For instance, where 
Hobbes sought to construct a theory of political power in Leviathan (epistemé), his 
concern was on how political power was deemed legitimate, or how it could be con-
stituted rationally (politeia).
108
 Machiavelli, on the other hand, was more interested in 
concrete exercise of power (dunesteia), and the practical engagement of doing politics 
(techné).
109
 
Rather than continue with a separation of the two traditions, we should strive 
for their reunion. Following Foucault, we cannot separate the analysis of the three 
poles; they remain necessarily correlated while at the same time being definitively 
irreducible. Thus, the aim here is not to shy away from epistemological social science 
and questions of the best institutional framework, but rather to re-approach them with 
a renewed goal of making them work for phronésis and parrhésia. That being said, a 
central point is still to be made; what power relations and mechanisms of power are 
relevant to the study of phronetic statebuilding? 
 
Parrhésia and Governmentality: 
Foucault’s study of parrhésia has been called a study of ‘ancient governmentality’. 110 
As it appears, there is more common ground between these two concepts than Fou-
cault perhaps would explicate in his lectures. For example, in his 2 February 1983 lec-
ture, he stated: “The problems of governmentality in their specificity, […] appear and 
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are formulated for the first time around this notion of parresia.”111 Accordingly, there 
are grounds for scrutinizing the relation between governmentality and parrhésia.  
The concept of governmentality was first developed in his lectures on Secu-
rité, Territoire, Population, where Foucault studied the emergence of raison d’État, in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth century.
112
 Here, Foucault discussed the process of the 
“governmentalization of the state” as a way of explaining how power relations had 
been tied to the central body of the state.
113
 By confronting the traditional sovereign-
ty-oriented theorizing of power, Foucault argued that we are “under the spell of mon-
archy” and continued, “In political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the 
head of the king.”114 Foucault was more interested in the mode of power that was de-
centralized and bottom-up as opposed to the centralized and top-down characteristics 
of sovereign power. This mode of power that was productive, it produced truths and 
reality and which rendered things thinkable. In short, modern power or “the power of 
rationality.”115 Through this approach, the study of governmentality, which has be-
come an increasingly popular concept in the social sciences, became primarily con-
cerned with liberalism and neoliberalism as regimes of power particular to the 
West.
116
 Nonetheless, despite all these contributions, there has been considerable con-
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fusion as to what the concept of governmentality actually contains – what counts as a 
governmental rationality and what does not? – and whether or not it can be applied in 
a global context.
117
 
However, studying governmentality as the ‘governmentalization of the state’ 
remains problematic. The concept of governmentality is broader than a particular 
mode of power. In Society Must Be Defended, Foucault wrote: “We should […] study 
power not on the basis of the primitive terms of the relationship, but on the basis of 
the relationship itself, to the extent that it is the relationship itself that determines the 
elements on which it bears.” 118 By this standard, the study of power (or governmen-
tality), to the extent that one studies the ‘basis of the relationship itself’, cannot be de-
duced to a study of ‘modern power’ alone. “With the idea of governmentality,” Fou-
cault explained, “I am aiming at the totality of practices, by which one can constitute, 
define, organize, instrumentalize the strategies which individuals in their liberty can 
have in regard to each other.”119 Accordingly, governmentality, broadly defined as 
power, has more connotations with Hediggerian ‘Being’ than with a way of ruling that 
is unique to the advanced liberal democracies of the West. To borrow Hubert Drey-
fus’s paraphrasing: “[P]ower is that on the basis of which human beings already un-
derstand each other”.120 Consequently, a study of governmentality is not only limited 
to studying western societies, but with any society, because as Foucault maintained, 
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“a society without power relations can only be an abstraction.”121 The possibility of a 
variety of different governmentalities, in that they constitute different strategies 
through which individuals within their liberty can utilize in relation to each other, 
must therefore be considered. 
Some would argue that Foucault’s main scholarly contribution is to the study 
of ‘modern power’, but if we take a step back and consider his last lectures, this pic-
ture changes quite a bit. The study of governmentality, or governmental rationalities, 
is supposed to include all modes of power; be they exclusively sovereign or exten-
sively bio-political. In fact, a complex relationship exists between the different modes 
of power: “[G]overnmentality is never singular and smooth, but always entangled in 
the complexities of places and scalar dynamics.”122 At the end of his lectures on bio-
politics or bio-power, Foucault commented on the existence of multiple governmen-
talities: 
 
You can see that in the modern world, in the world we have known since the nineteenth centu-
ry, a series of governmental rationalities overlap, lean on each other, challenge each other, and 
struggle with each other: art of government according to truth, art of government according to 
the rationality of the sovereign state, and art of government according to the rationality of 
economic agents, and more generally, according to the rationality of the governed them-
selves.
123
  
 
Indeed, Foucault had not intended a study of governmentality that would only include 
modern forms of power. However, his different studies – of the psychiatric hospital or 
the prison – can be read as a specific strategy for singling out different modes of pow-
er, making them visible and problematizable. 
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When reading Foucault it is easy to get the idea that the individual is banished, 
without the ability to affect the outcome of the strategic relations in which he is situ-
ated; only nothingness lies beyond the structures of power. This is true of much of the 
reading of governmentality; there is no possibility for the individual, or rather politi-
cal subject, as they are constituted in the analysis, to go beyond the hegemonic struc-
ture of power and knowledge.
124
 The autonomous individual of modernity is a myth. 
Yet, when Foucault stated in his lectures on parrhésia that “true discourse [parrhésia] 
… underpins the process of governmentality”, the political subject again becomes 
significant to the study of governmentality.
125
 
Indeed, there appears to be a subject, albeit a differentiated one from classical 
political thought. “It seems to me”, Foucault said in an interview, “that the question of 
an ethical subject does not have much of a place in contemporary political 
thought.”126 For where the theories of political power were based on a subject with 
natural rights, for instance in Hobbes’s and Rousseau’s work, Foucault, as we saw in 
his studies of parrhésia, constitutes the political subject as defined by the relation of 
the self to itself and to others; that is, an ethical political subject. Foucault had com-
mented on this essential difference in The Hermeneutics of the Subject lecture series: 
 
If we take the question of power, of political power, situating it in the more general question 
of governmentality understood as a strategic field of power relations in the broadest and not 
merely political sense of the term, if we understand by governmentality a strategic field of 
power relations in their mobility, transformability, and reversibility, then I do not think that 
reflection on this notion of governmentality can avoid passing through, theoretically and prac-
tically, the element of a subject defined by the relationship of self to self.
127
 
 
This aspect of the interrelation between parrhésia and governmentality is important, 
because by pointing to the different governmental rationalities at play, we can see that 
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in different contexts, while some actors are trying to promote reason, others are block-
ing this type of cooperation – effectively forcing the ‘power of rationality’ (i.e. gov-
ernmentality in the narrow reading) to fail.
128
 To a large extent, because of the em-
phasis on the ‘governmentalization of the state’, governmentality has almost solely 
been studied as a superstructure that directs every little minutiae of the world. The 
global bio-political or neo-liberal order that directs and arranges life in accordance 
with goals of normalization and optimization.
129
 Indeed, one is not a nominalist if one 
studies power as something that can be conceptualized as essential and universal. 
Therefore, if we are to grasp the mechanisms of power – the governmental rationali-
ties at play when those who govern really govern in context such as international poli-
tics and statebuilding, be they international or local actors –, we must insist on these 
mechanisms as being an empirical question: how does the actors in particular context 
constitute themselves as political ethical subject? If not, we will be scrutinizing, yet 
again, the straw-man of Classical Liberalism. Our ideas and institutions might be lib-
eral, but the world in its totality is not. 
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A Short Genealogy of the Statebuilding Literature 
This chapter will provide a short genealogy of the statebuilding literature, by outlining 
the different problematizations of international statebuilding: First, what are their 
basic questions – questions of politeia, dunesteia, or parrhésia? Second, how do they 
go about addressing these questions – as epistemé, techné, or phronésis? Third, what 
do they understand to be the main mechanism of power? Fourth, in so far that they 
provide solutions, what is the nature of these – institutional, concrete exercise of pow-
er, or an ethical practice of truth-telling? In short, I will sketchily assess the 
statebuilding literature statebuilding through the analytical framework developed in 
the previous chapter. Accordingly, it is not the merit of their analysis that is important 
here, but rather where their writing is placed within the analytical grid; what kind of 
questions and problems are they addressing – and how do they go about answering 
them? 
 
The Liberalization Moment: 
By the end of the Cold War, Fukuyama, encapsulating the prevailing Zeitgeist, argued 
that, with the fall of USSR, the last major alternative to liberal democracy had disap-
peared, and therefore described liberal democracy as “the final form of human gov-
ernment.”130 Mankind had reached the end of (its political) history. Now, all that was 
left to do was for the remaining non-liberal states of the world to re-constitute them-
selves as liberal democracies, by liberalising their economies and implement demo-
cratic elections. This, however, remains a solution that is only observant of problems 
of politeia by assuming that once elections are held, the people in power will govern 
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similarly to the way Western democracies are governed. The adequate game of poli-
tics is here ensured by the right politeia. 
What critics and followers alike seem to forget, is that, as a piece of academic 
work, Fukuyama was interest in making a philosophical and abstract argument about 
the “universal history of mankind” – in the tradition of Hegel and Marx –, rather than 
an empirical reality of liberal democracies.
131
 In that sense, he was interested in epis-
temé and politeia, which of course had disastrous effects once the thesis, became im-
plemented as policy; without an eye to the particular one is ill suited to govern. Fuku-
yama was aware of this as he stated: “there [will] be no further progress in the devel-
opment of underlying principles and institutions, because all of the really big ques-
tions [have] been settled.”132 If anything, his thesis was an end of the history of 
thought, a teleological reading of history based on the “logic of modern natural sci-
ence.”133 Democracy, to Fukuyama, remains a universal – eternal and pure –, not a 
particular practice or an applicable ethic. So too is the “last man” – an abstract and 
universal being, a construct of modern science. In sum, Fukuyama does not move be-
yond epistemic activity concerning the politeia, which creates a sterile, yet insightful 
examination of the universal and eternal. 
 
The Institutionalization Moment: 
While Fukuyama might be right in claiming that epistemic activity concerning ques-
tions of politeia have reached its endpoint, the questions of the concrete exercise of 
power and the endless constitution of ethical subjects (parrhésia) had definitely not. 
The next ‘moment’ of international statebuilding was to engage with at least one of 
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these – the concrete exercise of power, the particular and differential. Yet, the solu-
tion posed had not moved away from themes of epistemé and politeia. Thus, with a 
focus on the dilemmas and contradictions inherent in statebuilding, operating with the 
right ‘footprint’, or whether or not interventions had been ‘too liberal’, was highly 
influenced by the uncertainties of the particular and concrete.
134
 Nevertheless, not to 
the extent that the solutions were to be found in problems of dunesteia, the epistemic 
tradition having confidence in our institutional frameworks still stood strong. While 
there still is confidence in the scientific method, despair is understood to be inevita-
ble. This moment constitutes what could be called ‘the mainstream’ of the statebuild-
ing literature.
135
 
In his book At War’s End, Roland Paris argues that state-builders have under-
estimated the destabilizing effects of rapid liberalization. Reforms aimed at market-
ization – moving towards a market based economy and the exclusion of government 
intervention in the economy – and democratization – promoting periodic and genuine 
elections and constraints on the exercise of governmental power – had at the time lit-
tle success in establishing a lasting peace.
 136
 Paris, therefore, questioned the assump-
tions of the ‘liberal peace thesis’ – the confidence in democracy and free markets by 
themselves would ensure stability and progress was flawed. He argued that in socie-
ties emerging from war or instability, rapid democratization or liberalization would 
more likely result in renewed competition and violence; a certain aspect of how socie-
ties function seemed to have been forgotten. Drawing on thinkers such as Locke, 
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Kant, and Adam Smith, Paris argues that successful liberalization depends on the ex-
istence of functioning state institutions. The key to successful statebuilding, according 
to Paris, is therefore to institutionalize before liberalizing.
137
 
In what I, here, call the ‘institutionalization moment’, there is confidence in 
the belief that the search for the right politeia will provide state-builders with a ‘sil-
ver-bullet’.138 Accordingly, in Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States, James 
Fearon and David Laintin hold that institutional strengthening and construction is the 
only liable way for “political and economic progress of any kind” to be sustained.139 
Likewise, Stephen Krasner recommends, “shared sovereignty” as a solution to the 
most fragile states.
 140
 Building effective institutional frameworks for governments 
was the only, yet inadequate, way of securing lasting peace and security. Yet, another 
big concern of the ‘institutionalization moment’ is to dissect the various problems as-
sociated with ‘transitional administration’ – the inevitable tension of institutional 
frame-works that arise when the UN takes on the role as international administra-
tor.
141
 If not for sheer confidence in our knowledge about politeia, Simon Chester-
man’s sentiment, “Fail Again, Fail Better”, nonetheless seems like a fitting descrip-
tion for this moment of statebuilding.
142
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The Contextual Moment: 
By the late 2000s, the literature has paid even more interest in the contextual and the 
particular circumstances under which statebuilding efforts are taking place; the prob-
lems of dunesteia become ever more important and epistemic approaches are seen as 
insufficient to construct the right institutional frameworks (politeia). 
Contending that “external actors are not necessarily more powerful than local 
actors,” Ole Jacob Sending argues for the redirection of the scholarly focus to the con-
textual and local. Much of the literature, according to Sending, “hold as exogenous 
[…] the interest, behaviour, and power of local actors” constitute an explanatory 
problem.
143
 Sending pays much attention to how the institution of sovereignty shapes 
the relationship between international and local actors. Here, “the ends and means of 
external actors are undermined by sovereignty, whereas key features of how local ac-
tors operate – for example, through patrimonial rule aimed at the ‘politics of survival’ 
– are not.”144 What is more, international actors fail in large because they adopt an 
“Archimedean interpretation of the liberal peacebuilding model,” which is constituted 
by its “substantive elements (free markets, rule of law in keeping with human rights, 
democratic elections)”, which, in turn, are seen to be “non-negotiable principles that, 
in a sense, stand outside history and above politics.” 145 Thus, attempting to reconcile 
the universal ideals with the particular contexts of the intervened countries spells dis-
aster. The de facto exercise of political power and practice, associated with patronage, 
undermine the formal conditions and make them inefficient. Based on this analysis, 
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Sending recommends that researchers should shift their focus to the “relationship and 
interaction between external and local actors” so as to better capture the clash be-
tween “governing logics.”146 This can effectively be seen as shifting towards an anal-
ysis of problems of dunesteia with the means of a contextual understanding of the 
particular mechanisms of power (techné). 
Beyond this broader concern for the concrete exercise of power that the local 
elites enjoy, there is, in the contextual moment of problematization, also an interest in 
promoting a particular politeia. For example, in his book Post-Liberal Peace: The In-
frapolitics of Peacebuilding, Oliver P. Richmond argues that a focus on ‘the every-
day’ aspects of politics and society – where liberal and local modes of being meet – as 
the key to the successful establishment of a ‘post liberal-peace’ which recognises and 
respects difference.
147
 Likewise, Roger Mac Ginty argues for, what he calls, a “hybrid 
peace” – a way of “bringing the local back in.”148 In contrast to state-centric, or 
politeia-centered, solutions, which he describe as “technocratic” or “formulaic” inter-
ventions – which underline their epistemic emphasis –, the ‘hybrid peace’ arises from 
“variable geometry, or the sense that all the actors, institutions and ideas that combine 
to create peacebuilding are in permanent flux.”149 Similarly, Richmond talks about 
“blind spots” of the liberal-peace framework “caused [by their] problem-solving and 
epistemic frameworks.”150 In short, while rejecting epistemic approaches, addressing 
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questions of politeia, dunesteia, the context, and the particular remain firmly at the 
centre of these studies. 
 
The Nominalist Moment: 
In the late 2000s, some authors began to reemphasise epistemé and politeia. Fukuya-
ma in The Origin of Political Order continues an epistemological search for “the bio-
logical foundations of politics” as to better understand the problems of politeia.151 To 
Fukuyama, the key to building successful states is hidden in abstract principles. Simi-
larly Paris, while arguing that there is no realistic alternative to a liberal peace, signals 
a return to a world governed by traditional Westphalian states.
152
 The institutional 
moment is echoed, but with a greater emphasis on epistemé and a particular problem-
atization of politeia. 
In sharp contrast, David Chandler, in his book International Statebuilding: 
The Rise of Post-liberal Governance, problematizes statebuilding as a “paradigm of 
international statebuilding” – the shared way “through which the world is understood 
and engaged.”153Inheriting Foucault’s methodological nominalism – “instead of de-
ducing concrete phenomena from universals, […] [we should] start with these con-
crete practices and, as it were, pass these universals through the grid of these practic-
es” –, Chandler is interested in, in particular, how the Western way of approaching 
international statebuilding is formed as a governmentality. In doing so, he aims to 
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“understand [statebuilding] from the viewpoint of its practitioners and advocates: to 
understand it within its own terms.”154 
According to Chandler, a Kuhnian “paradigm shift” has occurred in our way 
of understanding the international and the state: “there is a different governmental ra-
tionality which gives policies and practices a different set of goal and frames of 
judgement.”155 This new governmentality, or paradigm (if we insist on Chandler’s 
terminology), is part of the neo-liberalist – or rather the neo-institutionalist – under-
standing of society, which is particularly related to the economic theorist Douglas C. 
North. In scrutinizing this new ‘paradigm’, Chandler draws heavily on Foucault’s 
findings in The Birth of Biopolitics. Here, Foucault found that, where the problem of 
liberalism is ‘how the market effectually could be regulated’, “the problem of neo-
liberalism is rather how the overall exercise of political power can be modelled on the 
principles of a market economy.”156 The goal was to make governments follow a cer-
tain rationality of governing, rather than attempting to implement policies themselves. 
The central point, Foucault argued, was that “the rationality of the governed must 
serve as the regulating principle for the rationality of government.”157  
Taking up Foucault’s point about neo-liberal rule, Chandler identifies three 
shifts in the practice of international statebuilding that constitute this new paradigm:  
Fist, ‘difference’ is privileged over ‘universality’ – it is expected that there is a differ-
ence between the non-liberal other and the West. Second, ‘preventive intervention’ is 
privileged over ‘autonomy’ – the autonomy of non-liberal states is problematized so 
as to legitimize preventive intervention. Third, ‘governance’ is privileged over ‘gov-
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ernment’ –the paradigm of international statebuilding frames the process of engage-
ment as a question of how to govern, rather than who should govern.
158
 
 
Towards Phronésis and Parrhésia: 
To summarize, we can now say that from a moment of liberalization characterised by 
confidence in the epistemé and politeia of the Western liberal democracies the 
statebuilding literature then moved on to a moment of institutionalization character-
ised by an increased awareness of the problems of dunesteia. Yet confidence in the 
epistemé and politeia of the West was seen a holding the solution. From here, the lit-
erature moved on to contextualism and localism, characterised by paying even greater 
attention to the problems of dunesteia, and, in so far that a polieia was possible, was 
arguments were to be founded on dunesteia and techné, and not epistemé. Finally, we 
have arrived at a moment of nominalism characterised by a study of statebuilding fo-
cusing on techné, but in so far as it constitutes an epistemé for its practitioners.  
Neither phronésis nor parrhésia have been mentioned in this short genealogy. 
The reason for this is straightforward: So far, the main focus of the statebuilding liter-
ature has been on instrumental-rationalities (epistemé and techné), rather than value-
rationality (phronésis). Equally, the attention has been directed not towards the mech-
anisms of how the truth is told (parrhésia), but rather on institutional frameworks and 
the problems of politeia, and how power is exercised as well as the problems of 
dunesteia. Thus posing the question, where are we going with the study and practice 
of statebuilding? It would seem, based on the previous chapters, that we are going in 
the wrong direction. Neither the instrumental-rationalities, nor their enlightenment of 
the two bodies of problems will enable us to perform better in statebuilding activities. 
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There is need for both phronésis and parrhésia to ensure successful statebuilding. 
Thus, the suggestion is that this is the direction in which the academic debate should 
move. 
The debate has not been totally absent of concerns for phronésis and 
parrhésia, however, but has remained to its margins. In International Statebuilding, 
for example, Chandler was only interested in describing a paradigm; there were no 
ethical considerations involved. These are left to the reader.
159
 Yet, when he describes 
the relationship between the international interveners and the society intervened upon, 
a constitution of an ethical subject of the internationals relation to the self and others 
starts to form through the paradigm of international statebuilding: 
 
The people and the elites of states and societies intervened upon are assumed to be incapable 
of bearing policy responsibility but at the same time the framework of statebuilding interven-
tion deny capacity or policy responsibility to the international interveners themselves.
160
 
 
In his earlier work Empire in Denial, Chandler characterised this relations as one be-
tween an “Lévinasian Other” and a “Western Self”, of which the former legitimises 
the irresponsibility of the latter.
161
 Indeed, this is far from the establishment of a 
parrhésietic pact between the two parties: the West clearly has an apologetic ap-
proach in the paradigm of international statebuilding, but what about the society in 
which statebuilding takes place? At the risk of having an omnipotent view of the 
West, we ought also to ask: how do the people in power in these countries form them-
selves as ethical subject in relation to self and others? 
 In fact, the term ‘paradigm’ is highly problematic. Here, Chandlers vocabulary 
seem to be conflictive, because it is unclear whether we can substitute Kuhn’s concept 
of ‘paradigm’ with Foucault’s ‘governmentality’. In this regard, is there such a thing 
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as a paradigm in the social science?
162
 In other words: To what extend is there some-
thing as a shared way of understanding, and to what extent does the social world re-
main a pluriverse? In this sense, Chandler’s ‘international paradigm of statebuilding’ 
constitutes only one out of many ‘governmental rationalities’. This much is clear 
when the changing meaning of sovereignty is studied.
163
 In so far Chandler has stud-
ied the contents of the governmentality of international statebuilding, what Foucault 
had called, a “study of the rationalization of governmental practice in the exercise of 
political sovereignty” – its expression, in the practice of truth-telling, is still left un-
studied; the experiences of statebuilding are more than their rationalization.
 164
 
In the beginning of the Biopolitics lectures, Foucault pointed out that his inter-
est was not in the concrete exercise of power: the “art of government” did not refer so 
much to the way “governors really governed.”165 The focus was not on the problems 
of dunesteia, but on the “reasoned way of governing”, or the way in which govern-
ment was reflected upon; the study of “government’s consciousness of itself.”166 This 
is where we differ. By proposing something akin to Phronetic Statebuilding, I am in-
terested in the frictions of politics, the concrete exercise of power, in explaining 
where statebuilding theorizing goes wrong and where it can find grounding again. I 
would argue that, although Foucault does not use it as such, his “politics as experi-
ence” allows for an analysis of this kind: to comprehend how governmental rationali-
ties clash, overlap, and utilize each other in the concrete exercise of power. This, as I 
see it, does not conflict in any sense with his case studies of madness, sexuality or of 
the prison. In comparison, I would argue that Foucault chose these examples specifi-
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cally to illustrate how modern power worked rather than to demonstrate how the ten-
sions between different governmental rationalities played out in specific and limited 
historical contexts, such as urban development projects, welfare policy formulations 
or international statebuilding projects.  
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Conclusion: 
This dissertation started out with the assertion that the practices and academic debates 
on international statebuilding had stranded between those who confidence in modern 
sciences to solve the problems of statebuilding and those who expressed despair at the 
ever renewed failure of such practices. The problem was framed as a problem of why, 
despite the efforts of both theorizing and critiquing, does the lack of success persist in 
statebuilding efforts? Taking a meta-theoretical or philosophical approach, the aim of 
this dissertation was, not to construct yet another theory of statebuilding within the 
framework of the ‘liberal peace’, but instead to develop an ‘analytical framework’ for 
the study of power relations in international statebuilding. Methodologically, this was 
done along the axis of the two interrelated themes of phronésis and parrhésia. 
The first chapter sought to outline the Aristotelian concept of phronésis. De-
fined as ‘practical wisdom’ on how to inquire and act on social problems in a particu-
lar context, Aristotle claimed that in contrast to the intellectual virtues of epistemé and 
techné, phronésis was the only reason capable of guiding action. Directed by the 
question of what is good and bad for man in particular circumstances, phronésis is a 
balancing act between the universal represented by epistemé and the particular exem-
plified by techné. To Aristotle, phronésis is closely linked to political science and 
therefore, for a society to flourish – to be governed in a good way – it needs 
phronésis. Taking up these ideas, Flyvbjerg argued that the social sciences, rather 
than following the epistemic ideal of the natural sciences, should turn toward 
phronésis. The task was not to formulate theories about the social world, but to clarify 
and mediate the risks and dangers inherent in society, to explore how things could be 
done differently and in doing so to not proclaim any final legitimacy on either ques-
tions or answers. On this basis it was argued that the way out of the ever-renewed 
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despair of the failure of scientific reasoning to solve the problem of statebuilding was 
to approach statebuilding with the ideals of phronetic social science. Rather than ‘sil-
ver bullets’, phronetic statebuilding would offer a dialogical stance in which 
phronésis is applied to an ever-changing social context. 
The second chapter engaged with Foucault’s studies on parrhésia, or the prac-
tice of truth-telling – ‘a mode of being’ in which truth is tied to the ontological com-
mitment of a subject uttering it. Foucault’s in his study of political parrhésia finds 
that the Greek secret of politics was that the search for the best regime is rooted in 
reconciling the principle of ‘ethical difference’ with the problem of government of 
others. ‘Ethical difference’ however, was not understood as simply excellent leaders 
or moral quality of individuals, but in the process of constituting the relation to the 
self on the basis of the difference of truth. That is, the truth as difference in reproach-
ing others and the prevailing public opinion in speaking the truth. When studying the 
Greek problematization of political truth-telling, Foucault found that individuals took 
charge of the city via the discourse of truth. Political parrhésia was the exercise of 
free speech operating within an antagonistic structure of competing individuals, de-
termining who was most fit to govern based on the subject’s constitutive relation to 
the self and the relation to others. The truth-telling of the political man is therefore 
designated by what Foucault termed “politics as experience” – dunesteia, rather than 
any organizational or institutional framework (politeia). In contrast to traditional po-
litical philosophy, which had favoured politeia as the answer to how societies func-
tion well, Foucault argued that it is the truth-telling (parrhésia) of the political man 
indexed to the concrete exercise of power (dunesteia) was what ensured the adequate 
game of politics. 
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 In order to construct an analytical framework the third chapter dealt with two 
separate issues. First, the linages and synergies between phronésis and parrhésia were 
explored. It was found that a relation of mutual dependence between phronésis and 
parrhésia existed. On the one hand, for there to be good parrhésia, the parrhesiastes 
must posses phronésis. On the other hand, parrhésia is required to make use of 
phronésis. After this discovery, an analytical framework was constructed around three 
separate poles: Phronésis/Parrhésia, Epistemé/Politeia, and Techné/Dunesteia. Sec-
ond, the chapter dealt with mechanisms of power in exploring the links between ‘gov-
ernmentality’ and parrhésia. Whilst urging for a broad conception of governmentali-
ty, it was argued that, if we are to grasp the mechanisms of power, we must insist on 
framing it as an empirical question. How do these actors constitute themselves as po-
litical and ethical subject and what are the governmentalities at play when those who 
govern govern (be they international or local actors), in the context of statebuilding? 
Looking through the lens of this new framework, the statebuilding literature 
was exposed as a short genealogy in chapter four, which revealing that the scholarly 
efforts, so far, has been a debate between two perspectives. On the one hand, those 
who have confidence in epistemic knowledge of institutional frameworks, and on the 
other, those who sought to explain the failures of statebuilding by reference to the 
contextual and local. As a way out of this stranded debate, it was argued that by turn-
ing towards phronésis and parrhésia international statebuilding would have better 
chances at success. 
As far as phronetic social science goes, however, two questions have been 
omitted: Is statebuilding, with its inherent inadequacies, desirable? And, what if any-
thing can we do about it? As for the latter question, no concrete recommendations 
have been developed, other than what this dissertation has suggested by advertising 
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the need for parrhésia and phronésis in international statebuilding. The former ques-
tion however, remains more complex. Are we assessing the failures of statebuilding 
or is it the broader question of the whole enterprise of statebuilding, as a policy, 
which is (un)desirable? This is more difficult to answer, as we ought to avoid idiosyn-
cratic conclusions. Whereas the prevailing frameworks for thinking of international 
ethics – cosmopolitanism and communitarianism – are based on a priory proclama-
tions about ethics, the ‘ethical political’ in parrhésia is about how one constitutes 
oneself in relation to self and others; and the ‘ethical practical’ in phronésis is based 
in a priority of the particular. Thus both aspects remain largely a posteriori and there-
by challenge the dominant frameworks of conceptualising international ethics. 
  
 59 
 
Bibliography: 
 
Aristotle (2004) The Nicomachean Ethics, translated by J. A. K. Thomson (London: 
Penguin Books) 
 
Aristotle (2009) The Nicomachean Ethics, translated by David Ross (New York: Ox-
ford University Press) 
 
Bernstein, Richard (1985) Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneu-
tics, and Praxis (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press) 
 
Bernstein, Richard (1989) ‘Interpretation and Solidarity’, an interview by Dunja Mel-
cic, Praxis International 9:3, pp. 201-219 
 
Bourdieu, Pierre (1977) Outline of a Theory of Practice, translated by Richard Nice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
 
Brown Chris (2012) ‘The “Practice Turn”, Phronesis and Classical Realism: Towards 
a Phronetic International Political Theory?’ Millennium - Journal of International 
Studies 40, pp. 439-456 
 
Burchell, Graham, Colin Gordon, and peter Miller (eds.) (1991) The Foucault Effect: 
Studies in Governmentality, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press) 
 
Burchstein, Hubertus and Dirk Jürke (2012) ‘The Argumentative Turn toward Delib-
erative Democracy: Habermas’s Contribution and the Foucauldian Critique’, in 
Fischer, Frank and Herbert Gottweis (eds.) The Argumentative Turn Revisited: Public 
Policy as Communicative Practice (Durham: Duke University Press), pp. 271-304  
 
Caplan, Richard (2005) International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and 
Reconstruction (New York: Oxford University Press) 
 
Cox in Cox, R.W. (1981) ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond Interna-
tional Relations Theory’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10:2, pp. 126–
155 
 
Chandler, David (2006) Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-building (London: 
Pluto Press) 
 
Chandler, David (2010) ‘The uncritical critique of “liberal peace”’, Review of Interna-
tional Studies 36, pp. 137–155 
 
Chandler, David (2010) ‘Globalizing Foucault: Turning Critique into Apologia – A 
Response to Kiersey and Rosenow’, Global Society 24:2, pp. 135-142 
 
Chandler, David (2010) International Statebuilding: The Rise of Post-Liberal Gov-
ernance (London: Routledge) 
 
Chesterman, Simon (2004) You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Admin-
istration, and Statebuilding (New York: Oxford University Press) 
 60 
 
 
Chesterman, Simon (2011) ‘State-building, the Social Contract, and the Death of 
God’, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 11-02 
Sending, Ole Jacob (2009) ‘Why Peacebuilders Fail to Secure Ownership and be Sen-
sitive to Context’, Security in Practice, Report Nr. 1, (Oslo: NUPI) 
 
Chesterman, Simon Michael Ignatieff and Ramesh Thakur, (2005) Making States 
Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance (New York: UN University Press) 
 
Clegg, Stewart R. and Tyrone S. Pitsis (2012) ‘Phronesis, projects, and power re-
search’, in Flyvbjerg, Bent, Todd Landman and Sanford Schram, (eds.) Real Social 
Science: Applied Phronesis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 66-91 
 
Dean, Mitchell (2010) Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, 2nd edi-
tion, (London: SAGE) 
 
Dobbins, James et al., (2007) The Beginners’ Guide to Nation-Building (Santa Mon-
ica, CA.: RAND Corporation) 
 
Dreyfus, Hubert (1982) ‘Why Studies of Human Capacities, modelled on Ideal Natu-
ral Science can never Achieve their Goal’, rev. edition of paper presented at The Bos-
ton Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science, October 1982  
 
Dreyfus, Hubert (1996) ‘Being and power: Heidegger and Foucault’ International 
Journal of Philosophical Studies 4:1, pp. 1-16  
 
Duffield, Mark (2001) Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of De-
velopment and Security (London: Zed Books) 
 
Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin (2004) ‘Neotrusteeship and the Problem of 
Weak States’ International Security 28:4, pp. 5–43 
 
Flynn, Thomas (1987) ‘Foucault as Parrhesiast: his last course at the College de 
France 1984’, in Bernauer, James and David Rasmusen (eds.) The Final Foucault 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press), pp. 102-118 
 
Flyvbjerg, Bent (1993) ‘Aristotle, Foucault, and Progressive Phronesis: Outline of an 
Applied Ethics for Sustainable Development’, in Earl, Winkler and Jerrold Coombs 
(eds.) Applied Ethics: A Reader (New York: Basil Blackwell), pp. 11-27 
 
Flyvbjerg, Bent (1998) Rationality and Power: Democracy in Practice, translated by 
Steven Sampson (Chicago: Chicago University Press) 
 
Flyvberjg, Bent (1999) ‘Bent Flyvbjerg En censureret students eventyr’, in Illeris, 
Sven (ed.) Danske Geografiske Forskere (Copenhagen: Roskilde Universitetsforlag), 
pp. 439-455 
 
Flyvbjerg,
 
Bent (2001) Making Social Science Matter: Why social inquiry fails and 
how it can succeed again, translated by Steven Sampson (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press) 
 61 
 
 
Flyvbjerg, Bent (2012) ‘Why mass media matter and how to work with them: phrone-
sis and megaprojects’, in Flyvbjerg, Bent, Todd Landman and Sanford Schram, (eds.) 
Real Social Science: Applied Phronesis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 
pp. 95-121 
 
Foucault, Michel (1970) The Order of Things, translated by A. Sheridan, (London: 
Tavistock and New York: Pantheon) 
 
Foucault, Michel (1977) Discipline and Punishment: The birth of the prison, translat-
ed from French by Alan Sheridan, (London: Penguin Books) 
 
Foucault, Michel (1978) The History of Sexuality: Vol. 1 An Introduction, translated 
by Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books) 
 
Foucault, Michel (1980) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 
1972–1977, edited by Colin Gordon (Brighton: Harvester Press) 
 
Foucault, Michel (1983) ‘The Subject and Power’, in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul 
Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (University of 
Chicago Press), pp. 208-226 
 
Foucault, Michel (1986) The History of Sexuality. Vol. III The Care of the Self, trans-
lated by Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books) 
 
Foucault, Michel (1990) The History of Sexuality: Vol. II The Use of Pleasure, trans-
lated by Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books)  
 
Foucault, Michel (1994) ‘The ethics of care for the self as a practice of freedom: an 
interview translated by J. D. Gautheir, S.J.’, in Bernauer, James and David Rasmussen 
(eds.) The Final Foucault (London: The MIT Press), pp. 1-20 
 
Foucault, Michel (2001) Fearless Speech, edited by Joseph Pearson (Los Angeles: 
Semiotext(e)) 
 
Foucault, Michel (2004) Society must be Defended – Lectures at the Collége De 
France 1975-76, translated by David Macey (London: Penguin Books) 
 
Foucault, Michel (2005) The Hermeneutics of the Subject – Lectures at the Collége 
De France, 1981-82, translated by Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmil-
lanp) 
 
Foucault, Michel (2006) The History of Madness, translation by Jonathan Murphy 
(London: Routledge)  
 
Foucault, Michel (2007) Security, Territory, Population – Lectures at the Collége De 
France, 1977-78, translated by Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan)  
 
 62 
 
Foucault, Michel (2008) The Birth of Biopolitics – Lectures at the Collége De France, 
1978-79, translated by Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan) 
 
Foucault, Michel (2010) The Government of Self and Others – Lectures at the Collége 
De France, 1982-83, translated by Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmil-
lan) 
 
Foucault, Michel (2011) The courage of Truth – Lectures at the Collége De France, 
1983-84, translated by Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan)  
 
Franchi, Stefano (2004) ‘Review of “Fearless Speech”’, Essays in Philosophy 5:2, 
Article 11. 
 
Frank, Author W. (2012) ‘The feel for power games: everyday phronesis and social 
theory’, in Flyvbjerg, Bent, Todd Landman and Sanford Schram, (eds.) Real Social 
Science: Applied Phronesis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 48-65 
 
Fukuyama, Francis. (1989) ‘The End of History?’, National Interest 3:18, pp. 3-18 
 
Fukuyama, Francis (1992) The End of History and The Last Man (London: Penguin 
Books) 
 
Fukuyama, Francis (2005) State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21
st
 
Century (London: Profile Books) 
 
Fukuyama, Francis (2011) The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to 
the French Revolution (London: Profile Books) 
 
Garver, Eugene (1987) Machiavelli and the History of Prudence (Madison, WI: Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Press) 
 
Ghani, Ashraf and Clare Lockhart (2008) Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Re-
building a Fractured World (New York: Oxford University Press) 
 
Hobbes, Thomas (1651) Leviathan (London: Penguin Books, 1985)  
 
Jarstad, Anna K. and Timothy D. Sisk, (eds), (2008) From War to Democracy: Di-
lemmas of Peacebuilding (Cambridge University Press) 
 
Joseph, Jonathan (2010) ‘The limits of governmentality: Social theory and the inter-
national’, European Journal of International relations 16:2, pp. 224-246 
 
Koshul, Basit Bilal (2005) The postmodern significance of Max Weber's legacy: dis-
enchanting disenchantment (London: Macmillan) 
 
Krasner, Stephen D. (2004) ‘Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and 
Failing States’, International Security 29:2, pp. 85–120 
 
 63 
 
Lang, Anthony F. Jr. (2007) ‘Morgenthau, agency, and Aristotle’, in Williams, Mi-
chael C. Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans J. Morgenthau in International 
relations (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 18-41 
 
Larner, Wendy and William Walters (eds.) (2004) Global Governmentality: Govern-
ing International Spaces (London: Routledge) 
 
Leslie Paul Thiele (2006) The Heart of Judgment: Practical Wisdom, Neuroscience, 
and Narrative, (New York: Cambridge University Press) 
 
Machiavelli, Niccolò (2003) The Prince, translated by George Bull (London: Penguin 
Books) 
 
Machiavelli, Niccolò (2003) The Discourses, translated by Leslie J Walker (London: 
Penguin Books) 
 
Mac Ginty, Roger (2012) ‘Liberal Peacebuilding: Extended Critique’, International 
Peacekeeping 19:1, pp. 135 
 
Mac Ginty, Roger (2012) International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid 
Forms of Peace (London: Palgrave) 
 
Mac Ginty, Roger (2012) ‘Hybrid Peace: How Does Hybrid Peace Come About?’, in 
Campbell, Susanna, David Chandler and Meera Sabaranam, A Liberal Peace? The 
Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding (London: Zed Books), pp. 209-225 
 
Merlingen, Michael (2006) ‘Foucault and Word Politics: Promises and Challenges of 
Extending Governmentality to the European and Beyond’, in Millinium – Journal of 
International Studies 35, pp. 181-196  
 
Miller, Peter and Nikolas Rose (2008) Governing the Present: Administering Eco-
nomic, Social and Personal Life, (Cambridge: Polity Press) 
 
Morgenthau, Hans J (1946) Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics (Chicago: The Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, Midway Reprint) 
 
Neumann, Iver B. and Ole Jacob Sending (2007) ‘”The International” as governmen-
tality’, Millennium – Journal of International Studies 35:3, pp. 677-701 
 
Nichols, Ray (1996)‘Maxims, “Practical Wisdom,” and the Language of Action: Be-
yond Grand Theory’, Political Theory 24:4, pp. 687-705 
 
Norris, Pippa (2008) Driving Democracy: Do Power-sharing Institutions Work? 
(Cambridge University Press) 
 
Nøhr, Andreas Aagaard (2011) ‘The Governmentality of Biodiversity in the EU’s 
Common Fisheries Policy’, The Interdisciplinary Journal of International Studies 7:1, 
pp. 1-14 
 
 64 
 
O'Leary, Timothy (2002) Foucault and the Art of Ethics (London and New York: 
Continuum) 
 
Paris, Roland (2002) ‘International Peacebuilding and the “Mission Civilisatrice”’, 
Review of International Studies, 28:4 pp. 637–56 
 
Paris, Roland (2004) At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press) 
 
Paris, Roland (2010) ‘Saving Liberal Peacebuilding’, Review of International Stud-
ies 36:2, pp. 337-365 
 
Paris, Roland and Timothy Sisk (eds.) (2009) The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Con-
fronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (London: Routledge) 
 
Pugh, Michael (2005) ‘The Political Economy of Peacebuilding: A Critical Theory 
Perspective’, International Journal of Peace Studies, 10:2 pp. 23–42 
 
Reid, Julian (2010) ‘The Biopolitization of Humanitarianism: From Saving Bare Life 
to Securing the Biohuman in Post-interventionary Societies’, Journal of Intervention 
and Statebuilding 4:4, pp. 391-411 
 
Richmond, Oliver P. (2005) The Transformation of Peace (Basingstoke: MacMillan) 
 
Richmond, Oliver P. (2011) A Post-Liberal Peace: The Infrapolitics of Peacebuilding 
(London: Routledge) 
 
Richmond, Oliver P. (2012) ‘Resistance and the Post-Liberal Peace’, in Campbell, 
Susanna, David Chandler and Meera Sabaranam, A Liberal Peace? The Problems and 
Practices of Peacebuilding (London: Zed Books), pp. 226- 244 
 
Rorty, Richard (1979) Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press)  
 
Rose, Nikolas (1999) Governing the Soul: The shaping of the Private Self, 2nd Edi-
tion (London: Free Association Books) 
 
Rose, Nikolas (1999) Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge 
University Press) 
 
Sending, Ole Jacob (2009) “Why Peacebuilders Fail to Secure Ownership and be Sen-
sitive to Context,” Security in Practice, Report Nr. 1, (Oslo: NUPI)  
 
Sending, Ole Jacob (2011) ‘The Effects of Peacebuilding: Sovereignty, Pastronage 
and Power’ in Campbell, Susanna, David Chandler and Meera Sabaranam, A Liberal 
Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding (London: Zed Books), pp. 55-
68 
 
Suganami, Hidemi (2008) ‘Narrative Explanation and International Relations: Back to 
Basics’, Millennium – Journal of International Studies 37, pp. 327-356 
 65 
 
 
Sujit, Choudhry (ed.) (2008) Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration 
or Accommodation? (Oxford University Press) 
 
Thucydides (1972) History of the Peloponnesian War, translated by Rex Warner 
(London: Penguin Books), p. 118 
 
Tuathail, Geartóid Ó, and Carl Dahlman (2004) ‘The Clash of Governmentalities: 
Displacement and return in Bosnia-Herzegovina’, in Larner, Wendy and William 
Walters (eds.) Global Governmentality: Governing International Spaces (London: 
Routledge), pp. 136-154 
 
Weber, Max (2003) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, translated by 
Talcott Parsons (New York: Dover Publications, INC.) 
 
Zücher, Christoph (2011) ‘The Liberal Peace: A Tough Sell?’ in Campbell, Susanna, 
David Chandler and Meera Sabaranam, A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practic-
es of Peacebuilding, (London: Zed Books), pp. 67-88 
 
 
